(2019)
(2019)
(2019)
(2019)
(2019)
(2019)
(2019)
(2019)
(2019)
(2018)
(2018)
(2018)
(2018)
(2018)
(2018)
(2018)
(2018)
(2018)
(2018)
(2017)
(2017)
(2017)
(2017)
(2017)
(2017)
(2017)
(2017)
(2017)
(2017)
(2016)
(2016)
Special Issue - (2016)
(2016)
(2016)
(2016)
(2016)
(2016)
(2016)
(2016)
(2016)
(2016)
(2016)
(2016)
(2016)
(2016)
(2016)
(2016)
(2015)
(2015)
Special Issue - (2015)
(2015)
(2015)
(2015)
(2012)
(2012)
(2012)
Special Issue - (2012)
pp. 391-399 | Article Number: ijese.2018.032
Published Online: July 08, 2018
Abstract
The amount of losses incurred by smog encourages all parties to participate in risk mitigation efforts. Law enforcement is one step that is often taken by the authority to reduce the number of entrepreneurs who open plantations by burning land. In addition to the punitive policy, efforts to prevent the burning of land are also required, for example, by providing subsidies for the planters. By utilizing laboratory experiments, this research aims to determine the effect of some treatments that might reduce the proportion of the population who burn the land and increase the proportion who perform manual land clearing, which is environmentally friendly. The treatments given are subsidizing, taxing, and the combined provision of subsidies and taxation. The results from the test of the population differences showed that there is no difference in behavior between the participants working as civil servants and non-civil servants in terms of choosing the investment method. Another finding of this study is that only the provision of subsidies was able to increase the proportion of entrepreneurs who choose environmentally friendly investment activities.
Keywords: taxes, subsidies, land burning, laboratory experiment
References
Becker, G. S. (1968). Crime and punishment: an economic approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76, 169-217. https://doi.org/10.1086/259394
Bodman, P. M., & Maultby, C. (1997). Crime, Punishment and Deterrence in Australia A further empirical investigation. International Jour. of Social Economics, 24(7/8/9), 884-901. https://doi.org/10.1108/EUM0000000004335
Brock, W., & Evans, D. (1985). The economics of regulatory tiers. Rand Journal of Economics, 16(3), 398-409. https://doi.org/10.2307/2555566
Burrows, P. (1979). Pigovian taxes, polluter subsidies, regulation and the size of a polluting industry. This Journal, 12, 494-501. https://doi.org/10.2307/134738
D’Souza, C. (2001). Integrating environment management in small enterprise in India. Electronic Green Journal, 14. Available at: www.egj.lib.uidaho.edu/egj14/souza1.html
D’Souza, C., & Peretiatko, R. (2002). The nexus between industrialization and environment: A case study of Indian enterprises. Environmental Management and Health, 13(1), 80-97, https://doi.org/10.1108/09566160210417859
Dean, T., & Brown, R. (1995). Pollution regulation as a barrier to new firm entry: initial evidence and implication for future research. Academy of Management Journal, 38(1), 288-303. https://doi.org/10.5465/256737
Dean, T., Brown, R., & Stango, V. (2000). Environment regulation as s barrier to the formation of small manufacturing establishment: a longitudinal examination. Journal of Environment Economics and Management, 40(1), 56-75. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1999.1105
Detiknews, Several editions. (2013).
Fischbacher, U. (2007). The Z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Exp Econonomics, 10(2), 171-178. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4
http://nationalgeographic.co.id/berita/2015/09/akibat-kabut-asap-kualitas-udara-pekanbaru-dan-palembang-dalam-kondisi-berbahaya
Iskandar, U. (2000). Pola Pengelolaan hutan Tropika. Alternatif Pengelolaan Hutan yang Selaras dengan Desentralisasi dan Otonomi Daerah. Bigraf Publishing.
Meiselman, D., & Tullock, G. (1973). The Economics of Crime and Punishment, American Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, DC.
O’Hagan, C. (1984). Pigouvian Taxes, polluter Subsidies Regulation, and The Size of polluting Industries: A Note. The Canadian Journal of Economics, 17(Aug 3), 588-592. https://doi.org/10.2307/135194
Otoritas Semu. Hukum vs Penguasa HPH di Indonesia. https://yuokysurinda.wordpress.com/2016/01/16/hukum-vs-penguasa-hph-di-indonesia/
Polinsky, M. (1979). Notes on the symmetry of taxes in pollution control. This Journal, 12, 75-83. https://doi.org/10.2307/134572
Potter, L., Lee, J., & World Wildlife Fund. Indonesia Programme. (1999). Oil-palm in Indonesia: it’s role in forest conversion and the fires of 1997/98. Jakarta: WWF Indonesia.
Pradiptyo, R. (2006). Does Punishment matters? A Refinement of the Inspection Game. German Working Papers in Law and Economics, 1(9), 1-29.
Restiatun, & Suratman, E. (2015). Effect of Injured Acute Respiratory Infection (ARI) and Having Toddler in household to the willingness to pay of Smog Risk Mitigation in District of Pontianak and Pontianak City, West Kalimantan. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, 211, 336–341. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2015.11.043
Ryan, M. J., & Vaithianathan, R. (2003). Medical Insurance with Rank-Dependent Utility. Economics Theory, 22(3), Oktober, 689-698. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-002-0336-1
Viscussi, W. K., & Evans, W. N. (1990). Utility Function that Depend on The Health Status: Estimates and Economic Implication. American Economic Review, 80(3), June, 353-374.
World Bank. (1997). Clear Water, Blue Skies: China Environment in 21st Century, World bank paper, No. EA2, Washington, DC, September.
Zweifel, P., Breyer, F., & Kifmann, M. (1997). Health Economics. Oxford University Press, Oxford.